While the issue was not before the Supreme Court in Franklin, we want to explore whether the Constitution allows Congress to put Puerto Rico into such a bind. Can it take away a government's power to enact a restructuring regime and put nothing in its place? Put in contractual terms, do the implicit terms of the deal struck between Puerto Rico and the U.S. federal government when Puerto Rico transitioned from the status of a colony to an "associated free state" in 1954 8 allow Congress to eliminate in full Puerto Rico's ability to restructure the debt of its municipalities? This question encompasses both the situation that existed in Puerto Rico prior to the enactment of PROMESA and the potential lacuna that could arise should a state enact a restructuring law for its own debts and Congress seek to void such action. 9 We submit that the answer is no.
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. The first is that we describe the situation facing Puerto Rico, its attempts to address that situation and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust. This articulation of the problem highlights the ills that can occur when a sovereign entity has the power to issue debt but lacks a means for resolving financial distress. We then ask the question of whether, when it comes to states, the allocation of authority between them and the federal government would allow Congress to put them in such an untenable situation. States under our federal system retain core functions.
The power to issue and restructure debts, we submit, resides in this core. Indeed, prior Supreme Court precedent holds that the power to issue debt necessarily includes the power to create a mechanism for restructuring that debt. We argue that while Congress can adjust this power by replacing a state's scheme with one of its 8 9 For an argument, which we endorse, that Congress can enact a restructuring regimes for states, see David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012). own, it cannot, consistent with federalism, prohibit state action while putting nothing in its place.
We then turn our attention to Puerto Rico. The much discussed Insular Cases seem to imply that Congress has substantial leeway in all matters regarding Puerto Rico. We show, however, that that colonial conception of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. federal government on which those cases rest cannot form the basis for determining what the allocation of authority between Congress and Puerto Rico is today. Congress transferred sovereignity to Puerto Rico through the process of the island becoming a commonwealth. As part of that transfer of sovereignty -something that was done in the post World War II era where colonial outposts were to be phased out as a matter of the new international order --Congress authorized and then approved Puerto Rico's constitution, which expressly gave the Puerto Rican government the power to issue debt and impose taxes. 10 This action, we submit, necessarily also gave Puerto Rico the power to enact a restructuring regime. Congress could negate Puerto Rico's right to put in place a restructuring regime, but only if it were to put in place some substitute mechanism.
Prohibiting the enactment of any means of restructuring cannot pass constitutional muster.
I. The Puerto Rican Fiscal Crisis and the Commonwealth's Attempt at Self-Help
That Puerto Rico is facing a deep fiscal crisis is beyond doubt. Its problem consists both of the amount of debt that it owes and the varying and vague priorities among its various debt instruments. 11 Unlike recently distressed sovereigns such as Greece and Argentina that largely issued only one type of debt -unsecured 10 For details, see Keitner, supra note 8. Some would argue further that to treat Puerto Rico's relationship to the rest of the U.S. through the lens of the Insular cases (where Puerto Rico was explicitly conceptualized as the "property" of the U.S.) would also arguably violate international law obligations of the U.S. See Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 283, 332 (2007) (emphasizing, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that the U.S. became a party to in 1992) 11 These are described in Park & Samples, supra note 7.
sovereign bonds --Puerto Rico and its various instrumentalities issued many types of debt. 12 Some of the debt came from various government agencies, such as the power company, the highway agency and the water company. Some of this debt was guaranteed by the main government; some was not. The main government itself issued multiple flavors of obligations, with the relative priority of the various issues a current matter of dispute among the debt holders. 13 When the bonds issued by the general government are added to the debt incurred by the various agencies, the total exceeds $70 billion. This sum does not include Puerto Rico's unfunded pension obligations that it has promised to its employees. Throwing these promises to pay into the mix brings the total indebtedness to over $100 billion. 14 The amount of Puerto Rico's debt is only half of the analysis. A government's debt load can only be viewed as unsustainable when it is compared with its ability to raise funds through taxation. Sovereigns with larger economies can support larger debt loads. When we compare Puerto Rico's debt load with its prospects for generating future revenues, the results are bleak. Puerto Rico's economy has little hope of servicing its extant debt stock. The island's population is only around 3.7 million people. Its Gross Domestic Product for 2013 was $103 billion, which is roughly the same as, and indeed could well be less than, its debt obligations (with unfunded pension liabilities included). Yet it's even worse than this snapshot indicates. The Commonwealth's debt load and its GDP are moving in opposite directions. 15 The island's debt has been ballooning for years. Its economy, on the other hand, has been in decline for over a decade. Many of the island's citizens have 12 There were differences among the Greek and Argentine sovereign bonds too, in that a small subset of Greek bonds were guaranteed by the state and both Argentina and Greece had bonds governed by the laws of different jurisdictions (e.g., local, England, New York, Japan Act contained a debt restructuring mechanism that drew its inspiration from Chapter 9. Chapter 9 allows for the instrumentalities of states but not states themselves to restructure their debts. Prior to its exclusion from Chapter 9, the same arrangement was available for Puerto Rico -it could place its instrumentalities into bankruptcy, but it could not use the provision for debts that it had issued. The law that Puerto Rico enacted followed this course; it would only be available to instrumentalities of the territory and not the territory itself. Puerto Rico in essence tried to restore what Congress had taken away.
Not so fast, claimed the holders of debt issued by Puerto Rico's public corporations. Chapter 9, they argued, contains a provision that pre-empts state restructuring regimes (and "states" in this case, according to the way the term had been defined, included Puerto Rico). 20 The most relevant case, in interpreting the predecessor of Chapter 9, was a famous depression-era decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park. 21 At issue was a law passed by the state of New Jersey to enable its municipalities to restructure their debts with an 85% approval of their creditors (and judicial supervision and approval). A subset of creditors, who were unwilling to allow the municipality restructure its debts sued, arguing that New Jersey was not entitled to take such an action. The Court in Asbury Park upheld the New Jersey statute, ruling that the states' police power includes the ability to enact debt restructuring regimes for their municipalities. To be sure, the Court said, the regimes could not run afoul of the Contracts Clause -in other words, the states could not put in place regimes that were aimed at simply expropriating value from investors and transferring that to the state. 22 Puerto Rico's response to the argument from the creditors was that, when Congress took away Puerto Rico's access to Chapter 9, it also took Puerto Rico out of the ambit of Chapter 9's preemption provision. In other words, preempting a state's bankruptcy law for purposes of ensuring a uniform municipal bankrtupcy system acround the country was fine, but only if the federal government was going to put something in its place (which is what Congress did for the states). Absent any federal mechanism to substitute for a state mechanism though, the state (or state type entity) was allowed to substitute its own mechanism -that seemed to be the teaching of Asbury Park.
A divided Supreme Court disagreed with this reading of the Bankruptcy Code and, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, struck down Puerto Rico's efforts to put in place its own municipal bankrtupcy system. 24 The Court sided with the lenders, and held that Chapter 9 preempted Puerto Rico's restructuring law. The effect of this ruling was to leave Puerto Rico with no federal law to help it restructure its debts and the inability to pass such a law on its own. It found itself in a position where it could take no action to address the existential financial challenge that it faced. Any future attempts to repair Puerto Rico's unsustainable debt stock could only come through congressional action.
II. The Power of States to Enact Restructuring Regimes
Before examining the situation that Congress created when it left Puerto Rico in the netherworld of debt restructuring, we begin our analysis with the question of whether Congress could do the same thing to a state. As a starting point, one might think, if Congress could constitutionally enact such a law for the fifty states, it surely could do so for Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico may have fewer protections against incursions from Congress than the states do, but, at least as an initial matter, one would think that it does not have more. 25 To begin, consider the following hypothetical. Congress, in order to promote efficiency and lessen the burden on interstate commerce caused by fires, creates a national fire department, and, in order to prevent needless duplication of effort, forbids states and their instrumentalities from creating their own fire units. Assume that at least one state is fond of its own fire departments, and seeks to have the new law striken down. To determine whether the new law would comport constitutional 24 Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas used textualism in reaching this result. See 136 S.Ct. 1938 , 1946 ("The plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends our analysis."). 25 We argue below that one can articulate a reason for greater protection for Puerto Rico from congressional interventation, see infra ___, though the position that we put forward in this article does not hinge on this argument. limitations on congressional inroads on state regulation of the state's internal affairs, it is necessary to delve into the Supreme Court's federalism cases.
At one time, the Court used to strike down with some regularity regulations that interfered with a state's "traditional" functions. Our hypothetical law would have likely been stricken down under this analysis, as establishing a fire department has been a function of states and their municipalities for decades. The Court, however, in Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority abandoned the project of demarcating which government functions were "traditional" and hence subject to constitutional protection. 26 The Court later made clear, in New York v. United States, that Garcia addressed federal laws that applied to states and private actors alike. When the federal government regulates the states as states, a different analysis now takes hold. The federal government is allowed, within limits, to encourage states to take actions -for example, speed limits on interstate highways within a state that are all below 70 mph --through financial incentives. 27 Alternatively, the federal government can regulate the activity itself, and forbid the state from regulating through preeemption. What it cannot do, however, is require that the states regulate in a prescribed manner.
Based on this framework, it seems that Congress's creation of a national fire department would be upheld. To be sure, Congress could not take over the extant local fire departments and run them -that would be commandeering and would run afoul of New York v. United States. 28 Having established a national fire force, 26 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) ("reject[ing] , as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'"). Garcia abandons the project of articulating traditional state functions as to regulations that apply to a range of private and public parties, it would be overreading that case to suggest that the Court would not act to protect core government functions when the Congress seeks to divest them from the state and put nothing in their place.
To be sure, Congress can exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate this space for itself, but it would violate basic federalism principles were it to remove this area from the states and leave nothing in its place. 29 Or put differently, the implicit deal among the states, to delegate certain powers to a 29 There are times when federal power restricts state power, even if there is nothing put in place. The clearest example is the dormant commerce clause. There, states are prevented from enacting laws, even though there is no conflict with federal action. In such a setting, there is no interference, however, with a core state function. central government and maintain others for themselves, is violated when the central government takes away the power of the state to protect its citizens in certain ways, without stepping in to do the job itself. The rationale for allowing Congress to step in here is that there are going to be some instances where the assumption that regulation is best designed and applied at the local level does not hold. In economic terms, these are the contexts where domestic regulation of an activity by the individual states will either under or over produce the levels of that activity in a way that causes harm to the system (negative externalities, in economic parlance). Here it serves the interests of everyone to have the regulation centralized. 30 Congress would be within its zone of power if it were to conclude that local control of fire fighting efforts has produced too little protection for the nation's citizens, and thus central regulation is preferable. It cannot, however, prevent the state from fulfilling a core function and fail to provide an alternative.
The same analysis applies in the area of debt restructuring regimes. We begin with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of municipal bankruptcies.
Originally, the Court struck down Congress's first attempt to enact a bankruptcy regime for municipalities, stating a concern that the provision at issue intruded too much on a state's sovereignty. 31 For our purposes, the most important case is the next in the lineage, Asbury Park. As described earlier, in that case, New Jersey had enacted a restructuring regime for its municipalities. Asbury Park was hopelessly insolvent, and sought to take advantage of this state-provided provision that allowed for a restructuring of the debt with the approval of 85% of the holders in principal amount. A subset of unhappy debt holders invoked the Court's preemption jurisprudence. They argued that when Congress enacted the regime that was validated in Bekins, it occupied the field and left no room for a state to enact its own restructuring regime.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, turned back the challenge. The Court held that the power to enact a restructuring regime is part and parcel of the power to tax and to issue debt in the first instance. The insight here is that issuing debt necessarily creates the risk that the municipality will issue more debt than it can service. It is not that the municipality is necessarily feckless when it defaults; rather, unforeseen events can well create a situation where the municipality simply does not have the financial wherewithal to service its debts.
Regardless of why the government finds itself in financial distress, the financial distress can make it impossible for the government to fulfill its core mission. If the municipality were powerless to restructure its debt, it would be unable to provide the basic infrastructure for its citizens. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
But, if taxes can only be protected by the authority of the state, and the state can withdraw that authority, the authority to levy a tax is imported into an obligation to pay an unsecured municipal claim, and there is also 35 Some have that similar concerns would render congressional efforts to enact a debt adjustment law for states unconstitutional. For an argument to the contrary, see David A. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 707-11 (2012). imported the power of the state to modify the means for exercising the taxing power effectively in order to discharge such obligation, in view of conditions not contemplated when the claims arose. * * * The necessity compelled by unexpected financial conditions to modify an original arrangement for discharging a city's debt is implied in every such obligation for the very reason that, thereby, the obligation is discharged, not impaired. 36 The import of the passage seems to be that those who buy a municipality's bonds are relying primarily on the municipality's power to tax in order to have the bond serviced. The power to tax, after all, is almost always going to be a municipality's primary source of income. The bondholders know this going into the transaction. The state has power over the taxing power, and it can deem how the taxes that are received are spent. To the extent that the government cannot both meet its basic needs and service the debt on the terms that it was issued, the state can create a procedure for the adjustment of the debt. As the Court said:
The intervention of the state in the fiscal affairs of its cities is plainly an exercise of its essential reserve power to protect the vital interests of its people by sustaining the public credit and maintaining local government. The payment of the creditors was the end to be obtained, but it could be maintained only by saving the resources of the municipality -the goose which lays its golden eggs -namely, the taxes which alone can meet the outstanding claims. 37 Put differently, the bondholders' primary expectation is to get paid back via taxes, and the state can ensure, via a restructuring regime, that a city maintains sufficient funds to run its operations and service the debt. Allowing the city to restructure its debt creates the possibility that the bondholders, while not receiving 36 Id. at 511. 37 Id. at 512.
as much as they were promised, will receive more than if the city were to not maintain its operations.
The notion that a restructuring of extant debt can enhance the overall welfare of the bondholders was also crucial in rejecting the dissenting bondholders' argument that the restructuring regime at issue violated the Contracts Clause. In rejecting the notion that the bondholders had their contracts impaired, the Court pointed out that the restructuring made the creditors as a group better off. 38 The value of the bonds held by the holdouts were worth more after the restructuring than before. 39 This observation implies that there are limits on the extent to which a state can restructure municipal debt. In the extreme, a state could not enact a law that took away the value of the bondholders' instruments. In terms of whether a bondholder was better off, the Court seems to be willing to say that if 85% (which, as noted, was the requirement in New Jersey law) were in favor of the new terms, that was good enough. Of course, no such limitation exists on Congress's power to restructure municipal debts. 40 The argument is that the power to tax is essential to the running of a state. It would be fanciful to propose that a modern state could finance itself without resort to this power. The power to restructure debt is linked to that power. Once the state allows a municipality to issue debt, the primary (if not only) way that the debt will be serviced is through the exercise of the taxing power. municipality has to be able to meet the basic needs for which it exists in the first instance. When feasible revenues cannot cover both the basic needs and the debt obligations, the state needs to have the power to orchestrate an adjustment in the debt burden.
Indeed, a moment's reflection reveals that a debt restructuring regime is part and parcel of issuing debt, at least where a sovereign is concerned. Despite the best efforts of those charged with running the municipality, it is inevitably the case that a debtor will on occasion find itself in a position where it cannot satisfy all of its obligations. Even putting aside the public choice dynamics that induce governments to worry more about the near term than the long term, 41 foresight is not perfect.
Anticipated growth in revenues does not always materialize. Investments in new infrastructure may not yield the return that was expected. There may be an economic downturn that causes tax revenue to decline well below previous projections. The city could see its tax base erode with the loss of a major employer.
A government utility can be whipsawed by rising commodity prices. There are countless ways in which things may go awry, and the municipality be left with a debt stock that it cannot service. If, in such a situation, there is no restructuring mechanism that the municipality can turn to, then what one ends up with is chaos.
At some point the municipality stops paying and then the creditors begin fighting amongst themselves and with the debtor to grab assets, at least to the extent that the municipality does not enjoy sovereign immunity. Such a system has little to commend it. It thus is not surprising that the Supreme Court held that a government's power to issue debt includes that power to restructure that debt when necessary. Now, with private firms, we could imagine a world without a debt restructuring mechanism. If the parties cannot reach an agreement to restructure the debt the business can no longer service, the firm can be liquidated. Indeed, liquidation is the most common outcome when a business cannot make ends meet.
Alternatively, the firm can have a capital structure that itself is designed to deal with future financial distress. One can imagine a system where the default on a debt payment leads to the wiping out of old equity and conversion of the junior-most debt into new equity. 42 Such options do not exist with a municipality. Liquidation is by and large out of the question. To be sure, states have at times termininated municipalities in order for the state to take over regulation of the affected citizenry. Yet there has never been a case where the body that issued the debt was liquidated for the benefit of the creditors. Taking over an operation is one thing; shutting down and selling off its assets and leaving the affected citizens without services is quite another. At a fundamental level, the municipal corporation needs to continue in existence so as to fulfill its public purpose. In this respect, a government is better analogized to an individual than to a corporation. 43 Revamping the capital structure of the distressed municipality so as to transfer control rights is also not an available option. Proposals in the private sector that call for the elimination of the interests of equity holders and a conversion of junior debt into new equity when financial distress hits, in effect cede control over the company to the creditors. Such is not feasible in the case of a government. We have no objections when one group of financial investors -equity holders -is replaced by another group -debt holders. One cannot imagine, however, voters losing their ability to run the government and having the operations taken over by bond holders. 44 Hedge funds can run companies; our democratic system does not countenance them running cities. That a state has the inherent power to put a restructuring regime for municipal debt in place does not imply that it has an obligation to do so. In theory, one could articulate a cogent reason as to why a state when it establishes a municipal entity may bar that entity from restructuring its debts. One could posit that those creating a new entity could decide that they want to ensure that the new public entity keeps its borrowing extremely low and funds almost all of its expenditures out of current income (taxes). For example, a state may be concerned about maintaining the creditworthiness of the state as a whole, and therefore wanting to constrain any individual entity from overborrowing and, therefore, putting the credit of the other constituent units at risk. The state, in other words, may be concerned about moral hazard. This decision though, the Supreme Court has made clear, is a matter for the states -it is a matter of state sovereignty. To be sure, the federal government has preempted states' power to create a restructuring regime, but it has put an adequate substitute in its place. The federal government provides a mechanism (Chapter 9) and the states get to decide whether they want to use it for their municipalities and, if so, whether there are conditions they wish to attach to its use.
Consistent with the foregoing, Asbury Park establishes that it is the states that have the inherent power to enact a restructuring regime. Congress, however, reacted to the decision by amending the federal municipal bankruptcy law so that it preempted state restructuring regimes such as the one in Asbury Park. But Congress did so by saying that it was giving states the basic mechanism to use, should they wish to use it; that option as to whether or not to have a restructuring mechanism was still squarely one that rested with the state.
To the extent that the power to establish a restructuring regime is an integral part of the power to tax, the question becomes whether Congress can take away this place by governmental officials, with a mandate to steer the finances back on track. They were not charged with looking after the interests of the bondholders first and foremost.
power and put nothing in its place. For the reasons that we articulated above, the answer is no.
III. Puerto Rico
The above section argued that the power to enact a debt adjustment scheme is an integral part of a state's sovereign power, and that Congress cannot take that power away and put nothing in its place. 45 45 A somewhat related question is raised by the Court's decision in Franklin. In order to be eligible for Chapter 9, a state has to authorize its municipalities to file for bankruptcy. Recall that the consent of the state was a key factor in Bekins. Can a state decline the offer of Chapter 9 and instead enact its own debt restructuring regime? We know from Franklin that 903 would apply to such an attempt. The difference in this case and the one we are considering is that as to the states Congress has provided the option Chapter 9, something that it did not for Puerto Rico. In other words, Congress did not take away the states' power to enact a restructuring regime and give it nothing; rather, it took away the states' power and said that the only route was the federal one. We think that this would be within Congress's power. 46 Putting the foregoing actions and statements together leads to the conclusion that Congress vested Puerto Rico with sovereignty somewhat on par with that of the states. Congress could override the Puerto Rico constitution by passing an inconsistent law, just as it could override a state's duly enacted law. But it lacks the power to unilaterally amend the Puerto Rican constitution. The Puerto Rico constitution itself provided a mechanism for amendment; a mechanism that involved actions only by Puerto Rico itself.
If anything, though not essential to our argument here, Puerto Rico should have greater protection from congressional inroads than do the states. When the Supreme Court got out of the "core function" game in Garcia, part of its articulated reason was the that the states, through their representation in Congress, had structural measures by which they could protect themselves. Each state has at least one representative. While the power of a lone representative is not great (though Puerto Rico, were it a state, would be entitled to four representatives), each state also receives two senators. As with every small state, the senators and representatives working together cannot ensure that a state gets its way. Rather, it is the case that these Congressional officials offer some guarantee that the interests of the state will be considered in the legislative process. They can join with others and form coalitions that ensure that they have a voice in the process. 58 They are not guaranteed to get their way, but they are guaranteed a seat at the To be sure, some have argued that Congress could not give away any of its power. For these scholars, the Constitution, when it comes to relationships with the federal government, contemplates only a limited number of possibilities. It is similar to the numerus clausus principle in property law. 77 For these scholars, the Constitution identifies and limits the type of relationships other political units can have vis-à-vis the federal government. A political unit can be a state, it can be a territory, it can be an Indian Tribe or it can be a foreign nation. That is all that the would have plenary power over Puerto Rico, and one could not object to Congress both barring it from enacting an insolvency regime and at the same time putting nothing in its place.
Yet another reading of the United States Constitution, however, is possibleand we think more plausible in the modern era. Congress began with plenary power over the territory. The act of working with the citizens of Puerto Rico to create a constitution, was, akin to an Ackermanian constitutional moment. 78 Of course, one does not have to ascribe to this particular vision of constitutional law to endorse the proposition that Congress is free to create types of entities in addition to those expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Any version of a living Constitution will suffice. Indeed, even an originalist could agree with our point, so long as she did not find in the Constitution an intent to limit congressional flexibility on this score.
Congress for Puerto Rico. Sovereignty once yielded cannot be clawed back through unilateral action.
Since 1952, Congress has maintained a relationship with Puerto Rico similar to what it has with states. Federal laws applicable to the nation can override local laws, as with all states. But Congress has not used its powers to legislate for Puerto Rico specifically. That power was ceded to the Puerto Rican government .
To the extent that Congress did irrevocably transfer sovereignty to Puerto Rico, it is beyond peradventure that part of what was transferred was the ability to tax its own citizens. Article 6 of the Puerto Rico Constitution, which, again, was approved by Congress, expressly provides that the legislature can levy taxes. As per Asbury Park, the power to tax contains the power to create a debt-restructuring scheme. If Congress cannot prevent a state from enacting a restructuring regime without offering an alternative, the same is true in the case of Puerto Rico. 79
IV. Conclusion
Puerto Rico has operated since 1952 in an uncomfortable place in our federal system. It is not a state, yet to call it a terriority would be to ignore the combined efforts of Puerto Rico and the United States to remove its colonial status. Puerto Rico, it seems to us, may not have the structural protections of the fifty states, but it does have a degree of sovereignity unlike that of a colony or a territory. That modicrum of inherent power includes the power to tax and, with that, the power to enact its own restructuring scheme for its municipalities. Congress can take that 79 At a minimum, this implies that when Congress created the nether world, it should have done so with greater clarity. It clearly was not inadvertent that Congress removed Puerto Rico from the definitional section. Given that there is no evidence whatsoever behind this action, it is impossible to know whether Congress thought that it was leaving Puerto Rico defenseless. At a minimum, given the quasi-state like status that Puerto Rico has today, the Court should require Congress to speak clearly when it wants to treat Puerto Rico worse than a state. It should not be allowed to invade the traditional government functions without a clear indication that that was its intent.
